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Philippines Fallout
Marcos' regime is rapidly losing support despite massive 
injections of foreign military and domestic aid. Australia's 
continued aid' for Marcos is placing both Foreign Affairs 
and Bill Hayden's human rights policy under considerable 
strain. Phil Hind reports.
hen Aquino was gunned
I 'Mr down by a Filipino guard at 
the Manila a irport  in August 
1983, his assassins obviously did not 
foresee the consequences of their 
actions. The assassination led to 
massive outpourings of popular 
dissent and boosted the previously 
divided and embattled opposition 
movement.
Twelve months later a Marcos- 
appointed panel had charged 25 
so ld ie rs  a n d  one c iv i l ian  with 
conspiracy to murder Aquino. Most 
prominent among those accused was 
Cieneral Fabian Vcr, Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff (now on indefinite leave) 
and cousin of  Marcos.
The o p p o s i t io n ,  th o u g h  still 
seriously divided, went on to score 
several victories in its continuing 
c a m p a ig n  to  end the M a rc o s  
dictatorship. Hundreds of thousands 
of  Filipinos were mobilised tn huge 
rallies of protest against Marcos, and 
in sympathy with Aquino. The 
protests continued right on up to and 
past the May 19X4 national elections.
I hey focused the world's attention on 
Marcos' continuing repressive rule 
and illustrated how isolated he is 
becoming from his people. For 
example, for the first time, significant 
sections o f  the business community 
began publicly to identify with the 
opposition.
The national elections also revealed 
s im i t a r  t r e n d s .  A l th o u g h  the  
opposition groups could not come to 
any linal agreement on their approach, 
the results reflected well on all sides. 
The boycott campaign is estimated to 
have moved over 15 percent o f  the
1
population imo not voting. The 
various opposition candidates, on the 
other hand, managed to outpoll 
Marcos candidates in Metro Manila 
and win twice as many scats overall as 
the most optimistic forecasts had 
pi ejected.
Not that the election of a new 
\  itional Assembly means very much 
n the wider scheme of Filipino power 
politics. Marcos was, and still is very 
much in control. He maintains his
effective right to rule by decree, and his 
right of veto over the Assembly. He 
directly appoints 17 ol the 200 
members of the Assembly. His 
executive power is enormous 
through his control over the direction 
of the economy, the deployment of the 
A r m e d  F o r c e s ,  p o I i c e a n d  
constabulary, and his pattuu.ige ot 
favoured business and mema interests.
But in other ways the election was of 
great significance. Marcos obviously 
saw it as a means ol trying to legitimise 
his authoritarian rule and as a tactic 
lor dividing the opposition. It was a 
gamble: one which he hoped would 
convince his US friends that he can live 
with m semblance of democracy.
I u e l u  notiths on, Marcos' rule now 
l oo ks  more shaky than ever.
30 A ustralian Left Review 91
The Geo-Strategic Context
J he American connection Ls very important in Filipino politics. The military stakes are very high. Although the US had a direct 
military and political involvement in 
the Philippines going back to the turn 
of the century when it became 
colonial ruler of the Philippines after 
the Spanish-Amcrican war it is the 
period alter the end of World War II 
which has most set the tone for current 
US interests in the .Philippines.
Following the surrender of Japan  in 
1945, the US was left in virtual control 
of the entire Western Pacific. The US 
granted formal independence to the 
Philippines and Korea in 1946, but 
stayed on as an occupationary force in 
Japan in order to completely disarm it 
and punish its former rulers.
developed two massive bases — Subic 
Naval Base and Clark Air Field.
Subic is the largest US naval 
support base in the Pacific. It 
functions as a refuelling stop, supply 
depot and repair shop all in one. It 
regularly services the US Seventh 
F l e e t  a n d  c a n  a c c o m m o d a t e  
everything from the biggest aircraft 
carrier and battleship task force down 
to the lowly patrol boat.
Clark Air Field is the largest US 
military installation of any sort in 
Asia. Its runways arc long enough to 
carry all types of aircraft — B-52s, spy 
planes, fighters, etc. It has huge 
a m m u n i t i o n  s t o r a g e  a r e a s  — 
including probably nuclear weapons 
stores. And it serves as a training 
g r o u n d  fo r  US fo rc e s .  M o s t  
importantly, Clark is part of an 
integrated network of air and naval 
bases: to the north Okinawa, the
The US quickly moved to establish a 
permanent military presence in the 
Asia/Pacific rim in order to  prevent 
any communist advances into the 
region. T his policy also became the 
pretext for  intervening militarily 
against the communist revolutionary 
m o v e m e n ts  w h ic h  w e re  t h e n  
developing in China, Korea, the 
Philippines and, ultimately, Viet Nam. 
The Americans committed themselves 
to a great network of permanent 
military bases and advance forces in 
the Asia Pacific.
With the victory of  the Chinese 
com m unis ts  in 1949, a n d  the 
worsening civil wars in Korea and Viet 
Nam, the US presence off the East 
Asian coastal rim became critical.
In the P h i l ip p in e s ,  the  US
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Japanese mainland and South Korea; 
to the east Guam; and to the south­
west Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean.
US military figures have long 
asserted the high strategic importance 
of the Philippines bases. So important 
are they that the US agreed to a $900 
million aid and grant package to the 
Philippines last year as payment for 
the next five years' lease. US Navy 
C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f  ( P a c i f i c ) ,  
Admiral Robert Long, told US 
Congress last year that it would cost 
the US$2 billion to replace the bases in 
the Philippines. Alternative sites, 
however, are hard to come by!
Significantly, the bases agreement 
also provides fo r - th e  participation of  
US troops, in security activities off the
assassination in August '83, there has 
been an enormous flight of capital 
from the Philippines to  the tune of 
hundreds of millions of  dollars. 
Foreign reserves have fallen to a 
p e r i lo u s ly  low f ig u re  and  the 
Philippines' ability to  buy crucial 
imports to keep industry running has 
been severe ly  c u r ta i le d .  W orld  
banking creditors and international 
investors held back for over 12 months 
on sinking more money into the 
Philippines economy, until Marcos 
agreed on terms for a program of 
economic reform.
This amalgam of problems and its 
re su l t in g  sh o ck w av es  w ould  be 
devastating in their impact even on the 
best of economies. In the Philippines
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bases". If nothing else, this provides 
the same "tripwire” guarantee which 
goes with the presence of US forces in 
Korea. Any popular dissent which can 
be portrayed as communist inspired 
becomes the ready-made excuse for 
US intervention in the interests of 
national security, saving American 
lives, etc . G iven  th e  p o l i t ic a l  
complexion of the US today post- 
Afghanistan. post-Iran and post- 
Grenada it is hard to imagine any 
scenario in which the US would fail to 
intervene in the Philippines if it saw its 
tenure over the bases threatened.
^ P h i l i p p i n e s  society is going 
M  through a profound economic 
and political crisis. The dual 
failure of its export-led development 
strategy and of the US-backed Marcos 
dictatorship is most evident.
The Philippines has the highest level 
of foreign debt in the Asia/Pacific 
region, apart from South Korea. Its 
foreign debt is fast approaching the 
size of its whole GNP. It currently 
owes $26 billion in loans to foreign 
creditors. Inflation is running at a 
yearly rate of between 30 and 40 
percent. Unemployment in urban 
centres like Manila has jumped, with 
mass lay-offs in '83/'84; while 
underemployment is rife in all sectors 
of the economy. Since the Aquino
they spell disaster. In a country where 
mass poverty and low wages are more 
com m on than not, where basic social 
needs like housing, health and 
education are a function of wealth and 
privilege, the effects of the economic 
crisis are particularly acute.
In the immediate post-election 
period. Marcos moved to institute a 
new series of austerity measures 
designed to stop the economy sliding 
even further. The World Bank and 
international creditors laid down 
tough conditions for the Filipino 
government to  fulfil before it will 
finalise any new loans. New loans are 
needed to bridge the growing gap 
between old loans which must be paid 
and immediate funds needed just to 
keep the economy ticking over. In 
effect, Marcos has mortgaged the 
present Philippines economy against
Bank and his- American-trained 
advisers, he embarked upon a course 
of "export-led industrialisation". The 
rationale was simple: by encouraging 
foreign investment in areas where the 
Philippines had a "natural" advantage 
over other countries, it could capture 
large parts of the Western consumer 
and reprocessing markets. Rapid 
growth, based on exports, would spin 
off into other sections of the economy 
and earn foreign exchange at the same 
t im e .  {The s o -c a l le d  " n a t u r a l  
advantages" o f  the Philippines were 
cheap labour and natural resources.)
In the  ru ra l  sec to r ,  M arco s  
encouraged a combination of  "green 
revolution" technology (i.e. high-vield 
rice varieties, pesticides, herbicides, 
etc.) with a large agri-business 
investment as an  attempt to radically 
l i f t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
----------Government troops
the hoped-for prospect ot a strong 
economic future. However, that 
strong economic future is perhaps 
more distant now than it was at the 
beginning of M arcos' rule 18 years 
ago.
The present crisis lies in the failure 
of the Marcos development strategy to 
deliver the goods. White martial law in 
itself produced growing popular 
resistance, such resistance may have 
been minimised had there been real 
and substantial benefits to a majority 
of Filipinos. But such benefits have 
not trickled through.
The Marcos Economic Strategy
y v 7 -hat was the Marcos strategy 
and why did it fail? Amid 
r  W  g r o w i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  
economic crisis in the last sixties, 
Marcos emerged as President with a 
commitment to a new development 
strategy. With the urging of the World
The government, for its part, provided 
the infrastructure in the form ot 
massive irrigation, hydro-electric and 
road-building schemes.
In f a c t ,  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  
infrastructure and incentives to 
investors was the name of the game in 
this type of development approach. 
The Free Trade Zones established by 
Marcos (called Export Processing 
Zones) in Bataan, Mactan and Baguio 
e p i to m is e d  th i s  c o n c e p t .  T he  
government spent billions of dollars 
on electricity and water supplies, 
t r a n s p o r t  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  
facilities, and construction of factory 
sites to service these and other foreign 
i n v e s t m e n t s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  
g o v e r n m e n t  w as  ofT ering :  ta x  
exemptions and privileges, tariff 
e x e m p t i o n s ,  f o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  
privileges, low rents, permission for 
100 percent foreign ownership and 
permission to impose wages lower 
than the going standard.
Marcos used martial law to
concentrate political and state power 
around his rule and. by so doing, to 
create the conditions favourable for 
foreign investor confidence. But he 
also created a crony network around 
him. Corruption, patronage and 
personal gain already endemic in 
F i l i p i n o  s o c i e t y  b e c a m e
institutionalised behind the closed 
doors of the Marcos dictatorship.
Thus, the Marcos government 
committed itself to keeping wages low, 
staple food prices low, and to massive 
spending on its own part. The big 
m o n e y  f o r  i t s  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  
programs it borrowed Irom overseas. 
U l t im a te ly ,  even the  repress ive  
constraints of martial law could not 
prevent the development strategy from 
starting to fail apart.
The Marcos plan created the 
illusion of development and, for a 
period, produced strong economic 
growth, but was vulnerable on many 
fronts.
Marcos Move Over?
/ n short. Marcos emerged from the martial law period with more problems than he began with. The economy is in a worse position, the 
opposition is stronger and more 
broadly based, and his overseas 
backers are not sure which horse to put 
their money on.
Even am ong M arcos' most trusted 
supporters in the US, there are clearly 
some differences emerging. Some 
sections of  the Slate Department, 
intelligence community and business 
see the need for a government with
greater legitimacy and less corruption
— one which is better able to manage 
the economy in the interests o f  foreign 
i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  e x  p o r t - l e d  
development. Scenarios for getting 
out of the crisis are now much talked 
about.
One scenario has it that the US is 
cultivating one or other o f  the leaders 
of the legal democratic opposition. 
Salvador Laurel, nominal leader o f  the 
opposition grouping, the United 
Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), is 
one such person being mentioned. He 
is not anti-bases or anti-foreign
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business; he is just anti-Marcos and 
anti-dictatorship. The problem for the 
Americans is how to back a moderate 
transfer of power white simultan­
e o u s ly  e x c l u d i n g  th e  r a d i c a l  
n a t i o n a l i s t ,  a n t i - A m e r i c a n  a n d  
socialist inclined opposition groups. It 
is precisely with these groups that the 
majority of popular support now 
seems to lie. If a more democratic 
opening is created, then these 
groupings will be present and vying for 
rep re se n ta t io n  a n d  pow er.  The 
burning questions of  land reform, 
improved living standards, and the 
removal o f  the US bases will then all 
assume centre stage. If Laurel 
remained loyal to the US in the face of 
this, he could well end up more 
isolated in Malacanang Palace than 
Marcos ever was.
Opposition Groupings
ho are the opposition? First, 
there are the traditional 
opposition politicians and
political organisations, primarily 
representing the interests of various 
wealthy family empires. Included in 
this group are the leading lights in 
U N ID O  such as Salvador Laurel. The 
stated political objectives of this group 
are the "restoration of democracy", by 
which they mean the restoration of a 
f r e e l y - e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t ,  an  
independent judicial system and an 
end to the military terror. This group 
has little or no criticism of US bases, 
and looks for continuing close ties 
with the US.
Secondly, there is a group of former 
politicians, who have developed a far* 
more critical position on issues such as 
US bases and the economic system 
operating in the Philippines. These 
include former Senator Diokno (a 
prominent human rights lawyer) and 
his grouping. Kaakby (Movement for 
P h i l i p p i n e s  S o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  
Democracy); and former Senator 
Tanada. who is a leader of a new 
g ro up ing  called the N ationalis t
Alliance for Justice, Freedom and 
Democracy. In general terms, these 
g r o u p i n g s  e s p o u s e  a r a d i c a l  
nationalist perspective and, although 
fairly small in numbers, are very 
influential.
The major opposition grouping is 
th e  r a p id ly  g r o w in g  N a t i o n a l  
Democratic Front; of necessity, an 
underground organisation made up of 
groups including the New People's 
Army, the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, radical C hristians and a 
variety of people's organisations 
covering different sectorial and 
geographical groupings. The N D F 
c la im s  o v e r  10,000  o r g a n i s e d  
members, with influence over many 
thousands of others through kindred 
organisations. US Embassy officials 
express the view that, in the long term, 
this group poses the most serious 
threat to the dictatorship.
The N D F  has a !0-point program 
which calls for;
•  the overthrow of the US-Marcos 
dictatorship and its replacement by a 
coalition government of represent­
ative democracy;
•  nationalisation of all US property 
and termination of treaties and 
agreements;
•  re-establishment of all democratic 
rights;
•  genuine land reform for peasants and 
co-operative forms of agricultural 
production.
A protracted armed struggle is also 
being waged by the New People's 
Army (NPA — the military arm of the
Communist Party), the NPA targets 
its attacks against the Philippines 
military and is widely acknowledged 
as acting to  protect the lives and 
property of  ordinary people in the 
areas in which they operate. Beginning 
in 1969 as a group of 60, armed with a 
handful of World W ar II vintage 
weapons, the NPA has grown rapidly 
to the point where its members are 
thought to  be in the order of ten 
thousand full-time guerrillas, backed 
up by local militias of many thousands 
more. The NPA now operates in all
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provincial areas. Their engagements 
with the military have captured the 
imagination of many Filipinos who, 
when privately expressing their 
frustration about Philippines politics, 
often talk abou t "going to  the 
mountains" — a euphemism for 
joining the NPA.
In the south of  the Philippines, 
another war is being waged by the 
Moro National Liberation F ro n t .  
(M N L F) which seeks an independent 
Muslim state. A number of southern 
islands and provinces are dominated 
numerically by the Bangsa M oro who 
claim to be an independent people of 
ethnic Muslim descent. The MNLF. 
although poorly organised, are linked 
with, and supported by. some Arab 
countries and are well armed.
The NPA and M N L F have 
recognised each other's sovereign 
claims and have mounted joint 
operations in areas of M indanao 
where their areas adjoin. Closer co­
operation between the two is likely in 
the future.
T h e  c h u rc h e s ,  C a th o l ic  and  
Protestant, have also played a key role 
in opposing the dictatorship especially 
on issues of human rights and civil 
liberties. On occasions, the large 
Catholic church (the Philippines is 
nominally SO percent Catholic) has 
exerted direct political pressure on 
Marcos. In the confusion immediately 
after martial law was declared, when 
most organisations were banned, the 
churches provided the framework 
within which human rights and anti­
militarist organisations could develop. 
The churches, on the whole, are 
exploring peaceful ways of resolving 
the political crisis confronting the 
Philippines. Leaders in the Catholic 
church have advocated "critical 
collaboration" with Marcos. At 
different times, Cardinal Sin has been 
supine towards Marcos and, at others, 
he has openly spoken against him.
Other church members, and some 
church organisations, particularly 
those involved with daily resistance 
and relief work, are committed to 
more radical transformation of the 
Philippines. In growing numbers, the 
more radical of these have shown 
a willingness to support the armed 
struggle,
Australia's Foreign Policy
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r he Philippines situation poses s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r e ig n  p o l icy  dilemmas for the Hawke Labor government. These problems relate 
not only to the US— Australia allied 
r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  b u t  a l s o  to  th e  
developing links between Australia 
and the Philippines over the past 
decade.
Civilian Aid
A  ustralia has been a generous 
giver of economic development 
aid to the Philippines since 
1972. Between 1972 and 1983, 
Australia gave S I20 million (1983 | 
values). A significant component of 
this aid has gone towards major rural 
development projects, one on the 
southern island o f M indanao (costing 
$41 million), and the other on the 
eastern side of Samar (costing $65 
m il l ion) .  B o th  these  a re a s  are  
economically backward. On face 
v a lu e ,  the  aid is needed  and 
appropriate.
However, these projects have 
attracted much criticism in both the 
Philippines and Australia. Instead of 
assisting the poorest people, the 
criticism goes, only the already well off 
will benefit materially. For example, 
one consequence of the projects is that 
poor tenant farmers will possibly be 
forccd off their land.
In 1981, Dr. Richards investigated 
these claims on behalf of Community 
Aid Abroad and found much evidence 
to support allegations about the 
military use of the roads in Mindanao.
The Sam ar project involved, in the 
first stage, A$25 million in aid, 
p r i m a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  to  r o a d  
construction. It commenced in 1978 
during the term of the Fraser 
government and the second stage, 
involving A$40 million was approved 
in 1983 by Mr. Hayden. Hayden said 
in parliament in November 1983 that, 
a l th o u g h  the  p ro jec t  was no t 
economically viable, it was sometimes 
necessary to undertake projects for r 
"political reasons".
According to the Asia Partnership
for Human Development (a Catholic 
development organisation) 50,000 
peasant families in northern Samar 
have had to flee from their homes 
because of military atrocities.
Military Aid
A  ustralia's military aid to the 
^ - 1  P h i l i p p i n e s  is lo w  in 
c o m p a r i s o n  w i th  o t h e r  
ASEAN countries, but still amounts 
to $1.5 million a year ('83/'84). The 
largest proportion  goes to training of, 
and study visits by, officers of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines 
[AFP] ($686,000). In 1980/81, one 
hundred and fifteen officers attended 
training courses in Australia. In 1982, 
Australia's then Minister for Defence, 
Ian Sinclair, claimed that Australia 
trains more A F P  officers in Australia 
than does the US.
In the past, Australian military aid 
has also been directed to the sales of 
Nomad aircraft and patrol boats. Last 
y e a r ,  we s p e n t  $ 6 0 2 ,0 0 0  on  
maintenance support for Nomads 
purchased by the Philippines Air 
Force, and another $100,000 on 
maintenance support for previously 
supplied D A R T  target ranges.
The dividing line between military 
aid. arms trade and defence co­
operation is a blurred one. In order to 
f u l l y  a p p r e c i a t e  A u s t r a l i a ' s  
relationship with the Philippines, we 
also need to look at co-operation 
between respective armed forces and 
equipment sales. Here are a few 
examples:
•  In the early 'seventies, Australia 
supplied 12 Nomad aircraft and later 
in the 'seventies supplied patrol boats.
* In February and March 1981, 
Australian Special Air Services 
personnel took part in combined 
s p e c i a l  w a r f a r e  a n d  c o u n t e r !  
terrorist exercises in Subic Bay.
•  In 1981. the Department of Defence 
arranged the sale to the Philippines of 
an automatic target range system 
called D A R T , manufactured by a US 
company in Australia. D A R T ranges 
are designed for training lor guerrilla 
and urban  fighting. The Defence 
Department acknowledged to  the 
Senate last year that it was "highly 
likely" D A R T was being used to train 
Filipino police and other sections of 
the Armed Forces,
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* In 1982, Philippines Defence 
Minister Enrile visited Australia, at 
Prime Minister Fraser's invitation, to 
explore e x p a n d e d  de fen ce  c o ­
operation, including possible further 
purchases of Australian military 
equipment.
Labor's Policy
r he e le c t i o n  o f  a L a b o r  government in 1983 has not, overall, produced any radical changes in the foreign policy line 
Australia has pursued in the region 
over the past decade. In large Dart, the 
differences in policy are more of
emphasis than substance.
The US alliance and its obligations 
in the region are still primary, 
a l th o u g h  the re  is c o n s id e ra b le  
emphasis on Australia developing an 
independent position. The crude anti- 
Soviet warnings of the Fraser years 
have dissipated.
The maintenance of  close ties with 
ASEAN is seen as vital, not only for 
defence purposes but also economic 
ones. On issues like East Timor, 
Kampuchea and military aid, this 
creates ongoing conflicts with other 
foreign policy objectives.
The Labor government has also 
vastly increased Third World aid. 
while seeking to promote human 
rights issues. The Father Brian Gore 
episode was a case in point.
Hayden has also indicated that he is 
sensitive to the need to develop 
"trickle-up" aid programs and not to 
supply aid which is being "used to deny 
human rights".
Hayden argues that by using a 
human rights policy and monitoring 
how aid programs are used, Australia 
can act as a restraining influence on 
authoritarian governments his 
"political reasons"argument. Howthis 
policy should apply to the Philippines 
is a d i lem m a  still fac ing  the 
government.
Alternatives
hat alternatives are there to 
this fairly wild foreign policy 
m i x ?  W h a t  p o s i t i v e  
initiatives might we expect a Labor 
government, with a measure of public 
persuasion, to  follow? There are four
a re a s  in p a r t i c u la r  w hich  a re  
susceptible to policy change and are 
consistent with a  more independent 
and non-aligned foreign policy stance.
•  S top all military aid, o r  at least 
suspend it, until such time as it is 
reviewed in light of: a) its connection 
with the repressive rule of Marcos, and 
b) its connection with growing 
regional militarisation.
It would be important that such a 
review cover all military aid and 
t e c h n o lo g y  t r a n s f e r s ,  s e rv ic in g  
arrangements, training and advisory 
arrangements, and joint military 
exercises.
•  Review all civil a id to the Philippines 
to investigate whether; a) it is being 
used to  enhance the repressive 
c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  M a r c o s  
government, and b) it is meeting the 
urgent humanitarian development 
needs of the Filipino people.
Some night argue that this aid 
should be stopped immediately, 
although 1 believe this would be 
premature without a full and public 
review. Others might argue that a 
review process should be used in order 
to develop appropria te  guidelines, 
consistent with the above objectives 
At stake here is whether people believe 
that any sort of civil aid projects can 
play a role other than simply helping 
to  legitimise ruling elites. It also raises 
the question that if we rule out giving 
aid to "repressive" governments, where 
would we stop?
•  Develop lines of communication
with all opposition forces who 
represent significant sections of 
F i l i p in o  s o c ie ty .  T h is  im p l ie s  
recognising that repression and social 
inequality are the greatest threat to 
stability in this area of our region. 
Australia's long-term interests lie with 
progressive and fundamental ■ social 
change in the Philippines.
•  A long-term aim must be to link the 
question of Philippines sovereignty 
and the presence of US bases with 
d i s a rm a m e n t .  In th is  c o n te x t ,  
Australian support for a Nuclear Free 
Pacific ultimately includes a Nuclear 
Free Philippines.
A l th o u g h  the  p re sen t  L a b o r  
government has refused to link the 
issue of warships and bases in any 
substantial way with support for a 
Nuclear Free Pacific, it obviously 
remains a critical long-term issue for 
any meaningful disarmament strategy.
By acting on these initiatives, the 
government would not only further 
the evolution of  Australia toward a 
more independent and non-aligned 
foreign policy, but would also assist 
that process of  social change which has 
now b ecom e necessa ry  in the 
Philippines.
This article Is based on a paper 
prepared with the assistance of Mike 
Beale and presented to a seminar on 
non-alignment organised by the 
Campaign for International Co­
operation and Disarmament in June 
1984.
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